Certainty and doubt
Examine how Wittgenstein answers Moore and the skeptic by asking what has to stand fast for doubt to make sense.
An original introduction. This guide accompanies the work; it is neither the complete text nor a translation.
Situating the text
Written between 1949 and 1951, during the last eighteen months of his life, the notes were never revised; the final entry dates from two days before his death. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright selected and published them in 1969 with an English translation by Denis Paul and Anscombe. They have become central to recent debates on skepticism and so-called hinge epistemology. These numbered notes respond to G. E. Moore’s claims to know that here is a hand and that the earth existed long before his birth. Wittgenstein argues that such propositions are not ordinary knowledge claims backed by evidence but belong to the background against which evidence counts at all: doubt itself requires that something stand fast, as a door turns on its hinges.
Following the arguments
Hinge propositions : Some certainties are not conclusions drawn from evidence; they stay fixed so that questions can be asked and doubts can be raised at all. World-picture : Each of us inherits a picture of the world against which true and false are distinguished; it was not adopted after testing its correctness. Riverbed : The image of a riverbed whose banks can slowly shift suggests that what stands fast may change, though not in the way ordinary hypotheses are revised.
Continuing the reading
Start with the first entries on Moore, then follow the world-picture and riverbed images in §§94 to 99 and the hinges in §§341 to 343, remembering that these are working notes, not a finished book. Written between 1949 and 1951, during the last eighteen months of his life, the notes were never revised; the final entry dates from two days before his death. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright selected and published them in 1969 with an English translation by Denis Paul and Anscombe. They have become central to recent debates on skepticism and so-called hinge epistemology.
Doubt and justification come to an end not in a final proof but in a way of acting that is not itself in question.
Your turn to think.
- Which of your beliefs could you not doubt without losing the sense of the doubt itself?
- How can a hinge shift over time without becoming an ordinary hypothesis?
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