New Essays on Human Understanding
Following John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding book by book, this dialogue sets Philalethes, who speaks for Locke, against Theophilus, who speaks for Leibniz. It defends innate ideas and principles as dispositions of the mind, argues that we have countless perceptions too slight to be noticed, and reworks Locke’s accounts of identity, language, freedom and knowledge.
Understanding the text
Leibniz wrote the work in French between about 1703 and 1705, using Pierre Coste’s French translation of Locke’s Essay. When Locke died in 1704 he chose not to publish a reply to a man who could no longer answer, and the manuscript stayed unprinted until Rudolf Erich Raspe included it in his 1765 edition of Leibniz’s philosophical works.
Key points
- 01
The veined marble
The mind is not a blank tablet but resembles a block of marble whose veins already outline the figure that the sculptor will bring out.
- 02
Small perceptions
We hear the roar of the sea only because we perceive, without noticing them, the sounds of each of the countless waves that make it up.
- 03
Except the intellect itself
To the maxim that nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses, Leibniz adds: except the intellect itself.
Explore the ideas in depth
Innate ideas and small perceptions
Read the New Essays as a debate about where knowledge comes from, comparing each claim of Theophilus with the passage of Locke it answers.
Situating the text
Leibniz wrote the work in French between about 1703 and 1705, using Pierre Coste’s French translation of Locke’s Essay. When Locke died in 1704 he chose not to publish a reply to a man who could no longer answer, and the manuscript stayed unprinted until Rudolf Erich Raspe included it in his 1765 edition of Leibniz’s philosophical works. Following John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding book by book, this dialogue sets Philalethes, who speaks for Locke, against Theophilus, who speaks for Leibniz. It defends innate ideas and principles as dispositions of the mind, argues that we have countless perceptions too slight to be noticed, and reworks Locke’s accounts of identity, language, freedom and knowledge.
Following the arguments
The veined marble : The mind is not a blank tablet but resembles a block of marble whose veins already outline the figure that the sculptor will bring out. Small perceptions : We hear the roar of the sea only because we perceive, without noticing them, the sounds of each of the countless waves that make it up. Except the intellect itself : To the maxim that nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses, Leibniz adds: except the intellect itself.
Continuing the reading
Read the preface first, then the first book on innate notions and the chapters of the second book on freedom and personal identity, keeping Locke’s Essay open at the matching chapter. Leibniz wrote the work in French between about 1703 and 1705, using Pierre Coste’s French translation of Locke’s Essay. When Locke died in 1704 he chose not to publish a reply to a man who could no longer answer, and the manuscript stayed unprinted until Rudolf Erich Raspe included it in his 1765 edition of Leibniz’s philosophical works.
Questions to carry into your reading
- What does Leibniz gain by treating innate ideas as dispositions rather than as thoughts we are already aware of?
- How does the doctrine of small perceptions change the picture of a mind that knows its own contents?
Against the blank tablet, the New Essays describe a mind active from the start and full of perceptions it does not notice.
How to read it
Read the preface first, then the first book on innate notions and the chapters of the second book on freedom and personal identity, keeping Locke’s Essay open at the matching chapter.
Editions & sources
Summaries and key points are original editorial interpretations. They accompany reading the work and do not replace an edition of the text. Editorial method →